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Abstract
We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset
of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents.
These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria
for the deciding players. In a concrete example, we recognize the partition
function of the Ising model and for high dependency we observe a phase tran-
sition to a new Nash equilibrium, which is the Pareto-efficient outcome.
An example we have in mind is the game theory for major shareholders in
a stock market, where intermediate companies decide according to a majority
vote of their owners and compete for the final profit. In our model, these
interdependency eventually forces cooperation.
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1 Introduction
Roughly 20 years ago, an exciting new set of methods has been introduced into
game theory: An underlying game G, such as the Minority Game, played by a large
ensemble of players, can be analyzed and often solved using methods from statis-
tical physics. For comprehensive overviews on the development of this subject, see
[CMZ05] or [Coolen05]. The analysis exhibits critical points where phase transi-
tions appear in the thermodynamic limit of many players and it provides models
for the emergence of mutual cooperation. The evolution of a large set of agents
with prescribed strategies or learning mechanisms have been studied as dynamical
systems e.g. in [CZ97], [Coolen05] or [NM92].
In this article, we want to focus on the influence of a large ensemble of agents on
the game theory of a given game G, including game matrix and Nash equilibria. In
the model we study, the game G is embedded into a hierarchy of automata/agents,
that pass decisions by majority votes. The top of the hierarchy remains a set of
new active/deciding players, which now play a new transformed game Γ. We then
wish to understand how the game theory of Γ compared to G changes, depending
on the given intermediate hierarchy. This has been solved by the first author as
part of her diploma thesis [Kraus11].
More specifically, in section 2 we suppose that we are given a weighted directed
graph H and a game G = 〈L, S, u〉 played by a subset of the vertices HV of H
called executive players L ⊂ HV . We define a transformed game Γ = 〈Λ,Σ, ν〉 with
new players Λ ⊂ HV . The graph hereby is imagined as a hierarchy of agents with
executive players L at the bottom of the hierarchy, while new deciding players Λ at
the top of the hierarchy successively control the behaviour of the agents according
to their influence. Conversely, the payoff of G for all executive players L is finally
collected by the deciding players according to the natural bargaining process in this
situation (Shapely value). Other payoff mechanisms are possible and got discussed
in [Kraus11] as well.
The main example for this model we have in mind is the stock market, where the
deciding players Λ send instructions through a graph that represents the structure
of the mutual ownerships of the companies. Finally, some executive companies
L play a executive game G in “reality”, such as prisoner’s dilemma or minority
game. So we ask, how the stock market and mutual ownerships of the intermediate
2
agents/companies have altered the game G to Γ.
To solve Γ thermodynamically, we need more than a partition function summing
over all possible strategies as done e.g. in [Coolen05]. Rather, the conditional prob-
abilities of one agent’s decision influencing another one have to be calculated. They
correspond physically to k-point correlation functions (see definition 8) and espe-
cially for Λ = ∅ (no deciding players) the overall expression reduces to the partition
function.
In section 3, we recognize that for treelike hierarchy graphs our k-point correlation
functions coincide with a generalized Ising model on the graph H. This enables us
in principle to write down the game matrix, Nash equilibria and phase transitions
of the game Γ for a given game G whenever the Ising model for H is accessible. Of
particular interest to us is the case where H is a random graph, which has been
solved in [DGH10].
In section 4 we demonstrate the approach and methods developed in this article.
We solve and thoroughly analyse an example of an executive prisoners dilemma G
being transformed to a hierarchical game Γ with again two deciding players, but
with a certain hierarchy of agents between deciders and executive G-players.
Especially, we can establish a phase transition in the game Γ, if the branching factor
of the tree is sufficiently high (otherwise we get only a tipping point) as the mutual
influence approaches a critical threshold. The phase transition in Γ separates a
phase with the (defecting) Nash equilibrium in G from a phase corresponding to
the (cooperating) Pareto-efficient outcome. Roughly spoken, if the mutual depen-
dency in decision making gets high, egoistic strategies become unstable and mutual
cooperation emerges.
2 Definition Of The Hierarchical Game
In the following we suppose to be given a weighted directed graphH, whose vertices
contain among others executive players L playing a game G. We suppose G to have
only two moves. The graph should be imagined as a hierarchy with executive players
L at the bottom of the hierarchy. The key notion of this article is then a transformed
game Γ = 〈Λ,Σ, ν〉 with new deciding players Λ at the top of the hierarchy, who
successively control the behaviour of the agents and collect the G-payoff according
to their influence.
3
1 2 3
executive
players L:
deciding
players Λ:
λ1 λ2 λ3
L playing the executive game G
instructions for G-moves payoff floating back
Definition 1 (Executive Game G). From now on, let G = 〈L, {Si}i∈L, {ui}i∈L〉 be
a game in normal form with players L = {1 . . . n} and each player i ∈ L having two
strategies Si = S = {±1}. The overall strategy set is hence SL = ×
i∈L
Si = {±1}n
and we denote the payoff for each player i ∈ L by ui : SL −→ R.
We denote by AB the set of all maps between A and B and by RA the vector space
spanned by the set A.
Definition 2 (Hierarchy Graph H). Let H = (HV ,HE , {fvw}vw∈HE) be a con-
nected, directed, weighted graph with vertex set HV and directed edges vw ∈ HE
with positive weights fvw > 0 for v, w ∈ HV .
We denote the direct predecessors and successors of vertices w, v ∈ HV by
pre(w) = {v ∈ HV | vw ∈ HE} suc(v) = {w ∈ HV | vw ∈ HE}.
We further denote by H0 ⊂ HV all vertices without predecessors and without loss
of generality we assume the predecessor weights to be normed:
∀ w ∈ HV \ H0 :
∑
v∈pre(w)
fvw = 1
Definition 3. (Hierarchical Game Γ = HG) Suppose a fixed game G = 〈L, S, u〉
and a fixed hierarchy graph H with L ⊂ HV . The transformed hierarchical game
Γ = HG := 〈Λ,Σ, ν〉 consists of
• A set of deciding players Λ := H0 = {λ1 . . . λm}.
• A strategy set Σλ = Σ = SL for each deciding player λ ∈ Λ. Such a strategy
formulates a G-strategy-command to each executive player i ∈ L. The overall
strategy set is hence ΣΛ.
• A payoff function νλ : ΣΛ → R for each deciding player λ ∈ Λ given by
νλ =
(∑
i∈L
φ
(i)
λ · ui
)
◦ pi ◦ PL|Λ. (1)
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The function pi : RΣL = R(SL)L → RSL is given by restricting a set of G-
strategy-commands for each executive player
(
σ
(j)
i
)
i,j∈L
∈ ΣL to the strategies
chosen for the respective player
(
σ
(i)
i
)
i∈L
∈ SL.
The functions PL|Λ : RΣ
Λ → RΣL and φλ : Λ → RL depending on the
hierarchy H will be defined in what follows:
– PB|A : RΣ
A → RΣB for subsets A,B ⊂ Σ denotes the conditional influ-
ence of players A on players B and should be read as a (|A|+ |B|)-point-
function. A deciding player λ ∈ Λ has been defined to have a strategy
σλ = (σ
(i)
λ )i∈L ∈ S
L =: Σ
formulating the aim to have each executive player i using strategy σ
(i)
λ .
These G-strategy-commands σ = (σλ)λ∈Λ ∈ Σ of all deciding players
λ compete along the hierarchy graph and determine an overall outcome
probability distribution PL|Λ(σ) ∈ RΣ
L as described in the next section.
– φλ : Λ → RL describes, how much of the payoff earned by each of the
executive player i ∈ L can be finally collected by a deciding player λ.
The condition
∑
λ∈Λ φ
(i)
λ = 1 is needed. In [Kraus11] we have discussed
different payoff collection mechanisms, but in the following we will re-
strict ourselves to the natural result of a bargaining process between the
deciding players Λ determined by the the Shapely value ([OR94]). This
particular choice has moreover the nice property to only depend on the
conditional influences PL|Λ.
Remark 4. Stock Market
An easy application of this model is a stock market. The game Γ = 〈Λ,Σ, ν〉 is
played by deciding players Λ (e.g. major stockholders). The graph represents mu-
tual ownerships of companies that pass the instructions of the deciding players via
(2) to the executive players: These equations represent a voting in each node, that
weights the possessions of the direct predecessors (respective direct owners) together
with a small percentage D, the free float of randomly voting minor stockholders.
The executive players L play the game G = 〈L, S, u〉 according to the instructions
they get - they act as agents and aren’t players in a game theoretical sense. The
payoff which the executive players get is returned to the deciding players weighted
by the Shapely value: The more influence deciding player λ has on executive player
i, the more is λ getting of i’s payoff ui.
So we ask how the stock market and mutual ownerships of the intermediate agents/
companies have altered the game G to Γ. Roughly we find that if the mutual depen-
dency in decision making gets high, egoistic strategies become unstable and mutual
cooperation emerges.
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2.1 Conditional Influences
We yet have to explain the function PL|Λ : RΣ
Λ → RΣL. First consider a neigh-
bourhood graph Hp,P consisting of a point p with predecessors P . Suppose a yes-
no-decision process, where σ
(p)
v ∈ {±1} represents commands of each v ∈ P to p.
The process shall be a vote in p, where every predecessor v has votes according to
the weight fvp and a percentage of D ∈ ]0, 1[ votes randomly ∼ N (0, σ2N ).
Lemma 5 (Single Vote). For the neighbourhood graph Hp,P the probability for a
result +1 in the point p under some given condition (σ
(p)
v )v∈P is
P
single
p|P
(
σ(p)v = +1 | (σ
(p)
v )v∈P
)
= 1− PN (0, σ
2
N )(−C) ≈
1
2
−
1
2
tanh(−aC)
at which C =
1−D
D
∑
v∈P
fvpσ
(p)
v and a =
√
2
piσ2N
. (2)
Proof. Denote by X(p) ∼ N (0, σ2N ) the Gaussian random variable of the random
voters.
P
single
p|P
(
σv(p) = +1 | (σ
(p)
v )v∈P
)
= P single
p|P
(
DX(p) + (1−D)
∑
v∈P
fvpσ
(p)
v ≥ 0
)
= P single
p|P

X(p) ≥ −
1−D
D
∑
v∈P
fvpσ
(p)
v︸ ︷︷ ︸
C


= 1− PN (0, σ
2
N )(−C)
≈
1
2
−
1
2
tanh(−aC) with a =
√
2
piσ2N
For approximation we use the similarity of the normal distribution and the tangens
hyperbolicus (see [Kraus11]).
Provided that H does not contain directed cycles, the entire voting process goes on
iteratively and we obtain straight-forward by induction for any A ⊂ H0, B ⊂ H:
PB|A(σ) =
∑
τ∈{±1}HV , τ |A=σ
τ |B ·
∏
p∈HV \H0
P
single
p|pre(p)
(
τ |p
∣∣∣∣ τ |pre(p)
)
If H does contain directed cycles then there is no terminating voting process. We
nevertheless propose in complete analogy to statistical mechanics to assign in such
a situation the conditional probabilities, which clearly reduce to the previous ex-
pression when no directed cycle is present:
PB|A(σ) =
1
ZB|A
∑
τ∈{±1}HV , τ |A=σ
τ |B ·
∏
p∈HV \H0
P
single
p|pre(p)
(
τ |p
∣∣∣∣ τ |pre(p)
)
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with the following now nontrivial normalization constant called partition function
ZB|A(σ) :=
∑
τ∈{±1}HV , τ |A=σ
∏
p∈HV \H0
P
single
p|pre(p)
(
τ |p
∣∣∣∣ τ |pre(p)
)
.
This expression can be justified by a random experiment as follows: Let the prob-
ability space be Ω := {±1}HV with product measure
P (τ) :=
∏
p∈HV \H0
P
single
p|pre(p)
(
τ |p
∣∣∣∣ τ |pre(p)
)
.
Take as events ΩA(σ) ⊂ Ω to be the event that holds τ |A = σ and analogously for
ΩB(σ
′). Then the conditional probability for ΩB(σ
′) under the condition ΩA(σ) is
defined as
PB|A =
P (ΩB(σ
′) ∩ΩA(σ))
P (ΩA(σ))
.
Plugging in the product measure P (τ) and taking a formal linear combination over
the outcome σ′ = τ |B yields the formula above.
2.2 Payoff Mechanisms
Once the conditional probabilities PL|Λ(σ) ∈ RΣ
L for given strategies σλ of each
deciding player λ ∈ Λ have been evaluated, this determines the behaviour of the
executive players to
τ =
(
pi ◦ PL|Λ
)
(σ) ∈ RSL.
This strategy produces in the game G a payoff ui(τ) for each executive player i ∈ L.
So how is this payoff collected finally by the executive players in Λ? Denote by φ
(i)
λ
the percentage of payoff of executive player i that is collected by deciding player λ,
the payoff collecting mechanism. Then the overall payoff function of the game Γ is
νλ : Σ
Λ −→ R
νλ(σ) =
(∑
i∈L
φ
(i)
λ · ui
)
◦ pi ◦ PL|Λ(σ). (3)
Example 6 (Payoff by shares). The most intuitive payoff collecting mechanism
for treelike hierarchy graphs is payoff proportional to the amount of shares of the
executive player i indirectly held by deciding player λ:
φ
(i)
λ =
∑
paths from λ to i
∏
vw ∈ path
fvw
This fulfills
∑
λ∈Λ φ
(i)
λ = 1 ∀i (see [Kraus11]). An example for this payoff collecting
mechanism is the paying of dividends proportional to the amount of stocks held by
an owner.
However, in the following we will restrict ourselves to the natural result of a bargai-
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ning process between the deciding players Λ according to their influence - the payoff
is hence determined by the Shapely value [OR94] of the obvious coalition function:
zi : 2
|Λ| −→ R
K 7−→
P (si = 1|σ
(i)
λ = 1 ∀λ ∈ K,σ
(i)
λ = −1 ∀λ6∈K)− P (si = 1|r
(i)
λ = −1 ∀λ)
2P (si = 1|r
(i)
λ = 1 ∀λ)− 1
This particular choice for a payoff collection mechanism has moreover the nice pro-
perty to only depend on the conditional influences PL|Λ.
Lemma 7. For the payoff function by Shapely value we get
φ
(i)
λ =
∑
K⊆Λ,λ∈K
(|K| − 1)!(|Λ| − |K|)!
|Λ|
(zi(K)− zi(K \ {λ})) . (4)
Proof. The necessary scaling condition
∑
λ∈Λ φ
(i)
λ = 1 is fulfilled (see [OR94]).
3 Hierarchical Games On Trees Are Ising Models
In the following section we prove that the conditional influence can be calculated
by using an isomorphic Ising model. For the common definition of the Ising model,
see for example [Nolting07]. Some first analogies are obvious:
Ising model hierarchical game
particles in a graph H same graph H
spin of particle v: strategy of v ∈ HV :
σv ∈ {±1} σv = (σ
(1)
v . . . σ
(n)
v ) ∈ {±1}n
interaction Jvw (with D modified) weights fvw ·
1−D
D
external magnetic field (is set to 0) some systematic bias (not treated)
In addition to that, k-point-functions are needed for conditional probabilities.
Definition 8. Let A,B be disjoint subsets of the nodes in the Ising model. Let
the nodes beyond A, named N(A), be the nodes of HV \ (A ∪ B), that fulfill the
following condition: Every path to any v′ ∈ B hits at least one v ∈ A. With
nodes beyond B (named N(B)) defined analogously, the nodes between A and B
are N(A,B) := HV \ (N(A) ∪N(B)).
With k = |A|+ |B| the k-point-function is
{±1}|B| × {±1}|A| −→ R
(σ′, σ) 7−→ 〈σ′ | N(A,B) | σ〉
=
∑
σ′,σ fixed
exp(−βHN(A,B)) (5)
where HN(A,B) is the Hamiltonian function of the restricted graph just containing
the nodes N(A,B) and β = 1
kBT
is the inverse temperature in the Ising model.
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Lemma 9. Let σv ∈ {±1} be the spin of particle v, σ ∈ {±1}|A| the spins of parti-
cles in A and let the external magnetic field be 0. Then the conditional probability
for σv given σ is
P (σv = 1 | σ) =
〈σv = 1 | NA,{v} | σ〉∑
σv
〈σv | NA,{v} | σ〉
(6)
Proof. See [Kraus11].
Remark 10. The Ising model without external magnetic field and with constant
interaction J is exactly solvable in one dimension, see [Nolting07]. In this case, the
conditional probability for two particles v, v′ with spins σ, σ′ and distance a is
P (σ′ | σ) =
cosha(βJ) ± sinha(βJ)
2 cosha(βJ)
(7)
where the case ”+” occurs when σ = σ′ and ”−” if σ 6= σ′. This remark will be
needed for the example in subsection 4.2.
Theorem 11. Every hierarchical game on a graph (as defined in section 2) that
fulfills the condition, that ∀i ∈ L the restricted graph of the nodes NΛ,i is a tree,
is isomorphic to an Ising model such that a process in the game that leads from
fixed σ
(i)
λ ∀λ ∈ Λ to the strategy σ
(i)
i = si of one i ∈ L is equivalent to a process
in an Ising model on the same graph with interactions Jvw = fvw
1−D
D
, inverse
temperature β =
√
2
piσ2
N
and no external magnetic field.
Isomorphic hereby means that the conditional influence and the k-point-functions
coincide.
Proof. For details, see section 4 in [Kraus11].
As the graph had to be specified to a tree-like graph, the process fixates the strate-
gies step by step. Therefore is it enough to look at the local fixation of a strategy
in one node and to compare (2) and (6). Doing this gives the interactions and the
inverse temperature as mentioned above.
Remark 12. The restriction to tree-like graphs seems harsh on the first sight.
However even a one-dimensional model shows interesting behaviour (see subsection
4.2) and also the calculation of Ising models on random graphs as done in [DGH10]
typically requires the graph to be at least locally treelike.
4 Solution Of The Hierarchical Game
4.1 Steps For The Solution
Let Γ = 〈Λ,Σ, ν〉 be a hierarchical game as defined in section 2 with Λ = {λ1, λ2}
and L = {1, 2}. (The restriction to two players allows the use of payoff matrices.)
1. Determining the conditional influence
With two players in each Λ and L, the conditional influence depends on only
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four variables obtained from the Ising model and equation (6).
conditional influence on 1 : x = PL|Λ(s1 = 1 | σ
(1)
λ1
= −1, σ
(1)
λ2
= 1)
y = PL|Λ(s1 = 1 | σ
(1)
λ1
= 1, σ
(1)
λ2
= 1)
conditional influence on 2 : x = PL|Λ(s2 = 1 | σ
(2)
λ1
= 1, σ
(2)
λ2
= −1)
y = PL|Λ(s2 = 1 | σ
(2)
λ1
= 1, σ
(2)
λ2
= 1)
2. Building up the pre-payoff matrix
The pre-payoffmatrix assigns to every combination of strategies σ = (σλ1 , σλ2 )
in ΣΛ the expected payoff ui to executive player i ∈ L in game G:
E[(u1, u2) | σ] = (u1, u2) ◦ pi ◦ PL|Λ(σ)
=
∑
s∈S
PL|Λ(s | σλ1 , σλ2) · u(s)
=
∑
s1
∑
s2
PL|Λ(s1 | σ
(1)
λ1
, σ
(1)
λ2
) · PL|Λ(s2 | σ
(2)
λ1
, σ
(2)
λ2
) · u(s1, s2)
3. Building up the payoff matrix
To get the payoff matrix νλ for Γ as defined in equation (3) multiply every
item in the pre-payoff matrix with(
φ
(1)
λ1
φ
(1)
λ2
φ
(2)
λ1
φ
(2)
λ2
)
=
(
y−x
2y−1
x+y−1
2y−1
x+y−1
2y−1
y−x
2y−1
)
.
4. Usual methods
Now that there is a payoff matrix for the game, the usual game theoretical
methods can be applied to find Nash equilibria and phase transitions.
4.2 Example To Step 1: Easy Hierarchical Graph
λ1 : σλ1 = (σ
(1)
λ1
, σ
(2)
λ1
)
1 : s1 2 : s2
λ2 : σλ2 = (σ
(1)
λ2
, σ
(2)
λ2
)
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
a© d©
b© c©
Figure 1: One-dimensional hierarchical game
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In the one-dimensional hierarchical game, the deciding and executive players are
connected by chains of a, b, c or d edges. Therefore the weights are 1, except down
at the executive players (weights 12 ). Let D be
1
2 . The conditional influence can
now be calculated with equation (7) which leads to
x = PL|Λ(s1 = 1 | σ
(1)
λ1
= −1, σ
(1)
λ2
= 1) =
µ(−, a) · µ(+, c)
µ(−, a) · µ(+, c) + µ(+, a) · µ(−, c)
y = PL|Λ(s1 = 1 | σ
(1)
λ1
= 1, σ
(1)
λ2
= 1) =
µ(+, a) · µ(+, c)
µ(+, a) · µ(+, c) + µ(−, a) · µ(−, c)
where µ(±, k) = coshk−1(β) cosh(β2 )± sinh
k−1(β) sinh(β2 ).
x(a,β)
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
a
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
β
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
y(a=c,β)
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
a=c
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
β
 0.5
 0.75
 1
 1.25
 1.5
Figure 2: Conditional influence x with fixed c (left) and conditional influence y with
a = c (right)
As x is a measure for player 1 obeying rather λ2 than λ1 if their instructions differ,
x is growing if a increases and the influence of λ1 therefore decreases as it can be
seen on the left. However, for small β (which means high temperature T ) x is close
to 12 no matter how far the deciding players are from each other. As y shows how
much player 1 is likely to obey λ1 and λ2 if they agree, the right graph shows how
y is close to 1 if both deciding players are near to 1 at a low temperature. If the
distance and the temperature increase, 1 tends to choose its strategy randomly with
probability 12 .
4.3 Example To Step 2-4: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Let the game G be the well-known prisoner’s dilemma with payoff matrix
C(ooperation) D(efection)
C (1, 1) (−3, 3)
D (3,−3) (−1,−1)
.
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Let the conditional influence be symmetric, so it goes down to just two variables x
and y:
x = PL|Λ(s1 = C | σ
(1)
λ1
= D, σ
(1)
λ2
= C) = x
y = PL|Λ(s1 = C | σ
(1)
λ1
= C, σ
(1)
λ2
= C) = y
The complete payoff matrix has been calculated in [Kraus11].
Depending on x and y the hierarchical game Γ is isomorphic to one of the following
games with unique Nash equilibrium σˆ and the tipping points for these three states
are x = 2−y3 and x =
y+1
3 :
y
x
prisoner’s dilemma
(version 2)
cooperation
prisoner’s dilemma
(version 1)
1
3
2
3
0.5
0
1
0.5
1.0
Figure 3: Illustration of the situation of Γ depending on x and y
1. Γ is a prisoner’s dilemma where
for λ1 : (C,C) ≃ Cooperation, (D,C) ≃ Defection
for λ2 : (C,C) ≃ Cooperation, (C,D) ≃ Defection
That means, λ1 identifies with 1 and λ2 identifies with 2.
Hence the unique Nash equilibrium is σˆ = (σˆλ1 , σˆλ2 ) = ((D,C), (C,D)).
2. Γ is a prisoner’s dilemma where
for λ1 : (C,C) ≃ Cooperation, (C,D) ≃ Defection
for λ2 : (C,C) ≃ Cooperation, (D,C) ≃ Defection
That means, λ1 identifies with 2 and λ2 identifies with 1.
Hence the unique Nash equilibrium is σˆ = ((C,D), (D,C)).
3. Cooperation:
For λ1 and λ2, the strategy (C,C) dominates every other strategy and there-
fore σˆ = ((C,C), (C,C)).
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Because of the symmetry the payoffs of λ1 and λ2 coincide: ν
x,y
λ1
(σˆ) = νx,yλ2 (σˆ).
Hence the value of the game, i.e. the payoff in the Nash equilibrium σˆ, is as follows:
ν
x,y
λ1
(σˆ) =


−1 + 2x x < 2−y3
−1 + 2y 2−y3 < x <
y+1
3
1− 2x x > y+13
Remark 13. In the 1-dimensional hierarchy considered in section 4.2 we had
x =
µ(−, a) · µ(+, c)
µ(−, a) · µ(+, c) + µ(+, a) · µ(−, c)
y =
µ(+, a) · µ(+, c)
µ(+, a) · µ(+, c) + µ(−, a) · µ(−, c)
where µ(±, k) = coshk−1(β) cosh(β2 )± sinh
k−1(β) sinh(β2 ) and the inverse tempera-
ture β =
√
2
piσ2
N
depended on the random minority voters.
Hence in the one-dimensional hierarchy we get the tipping points above, but x and
y are still smooth functions in β. On the contrary, for a two-dimensional hierarchy,
x and y would exhibit proper non-analytical phase transitions in the thermodynamic
limit, turning the tipping points into proper phase transitions.
5 Open Questions
Question 14. If we choose the Shapely value as payoff mechanism as above, the
overall transformed game Γ depends only on the game G and the correlators. What
can be said in general about the game theory of Γ compared to G without explicit
knowledge of the correlators (under some reasonable, general assumptions)?
Question 15. It would be interesting to derive closed expressions for the correlators
of an Ising model on a locally treelike random graph, similarly to the partition
functions obtained in this case in [DGH10]; it is to be expected that e.g. the 2-point
correlator depends only on the distance. This would yield a very nice explicitly
solvable model with phase transition for games on randomly dependent agents.
Question 16. Our model does not necessarily require the graph to be a directed
tree, see end of section 2.1. In fact, mutual dependencies might be more realistic.
Then the following issues arise:
• Even in the easiest case, the partition sum does (to our surprise) not coincide
with the partition sum of the Ising model. Rather, there are corrections for
every directed loop. It would be nice to explain this behaviour and/or derive
expressions for the partition sum, phase transition etc. in this modified ver-
sions using the same techniques from statistical physics as for the Ising model
(transfer matrix for small dimension, mean field method for large dimension
resp. branching number).
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• Alternatively, one might introduce a relaxation time, so the model gains a time
dependence. This could be interesting to study non-stationary behaviour.
Question 17. Can there be obtained statistical real-world evidence (and quantified),
that the existence of inter-dependency on the path between deciding players and
actual decision (as modelled in this article) increases cooperation?
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